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Tailoring Globalization to Reduce Global Poverty and
Inequality: a Case Study of the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral
Textile Agreement

JIMMY HOWELL*

I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization has done little to fight global poverty and inequality.1
Though some critics have used this fact to argue against global economic
integration,2 this article explains that those in favor of a freer and fairer global
trade and finance system must link that regime with labor rights in order to
* Jimmy Howell is in his third and final year of the J.D. program at American
University's Washington College of Law. He is concurrently enrolled in an ABAcooperative program earning a D.E.J.E.I. (Diplôme des études juridiques européennes
et internationales) at the Université de Paris-X. In the fall of 2006, he will be an
associate at the law firm Thompson Hine, LLP. The author would like to thank
several people who were involved with the writing of this article. First and foremost
is Tonya Keusseyan who offered advice, encouragement, and humor at every step of
the writing process. I thank Professor Jerome Levinson for inspiring me to study
“legal architectures” in the field of international trade and finance. As well as my
parents Jim and Debbie Howell for their support. Finally, I am grateful to Professor
Tom Sargentich who always encouraged curiosity into the role of law and
government in our daily lives. I hope this article makes all of them proud.
1
See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2-3
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1999) (studying the relationship between economic integration,
global poverty, and inequality), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/pdf/hdr_1999_full.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2005). The income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the richest
countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, an increase from 1990 when
the same ratio was 60 to 1 and 1960 when it was 30 to 1. Id. at 3. The wealthiest
twenty percent of the world’s population share in eighty-six percent of the world’s
GDP, while the poorest twenty percent receive only one percent of the world’s GDP.
Id. at 2.
2
See Gijsbert van Liemt, Towards a different kind of globalization, or how the
anti-globalists view the world, 3-5 (Mar. 2004) (explaining that anti-globalist reasons
against globalization range from agriculture to cultural identity).
418
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achieve a reduction in global poverty and a more equitable distribution of
trade gains.3 Without this connection, today’s most powerful economies will
be tomorrow’s least relevant markets, finding themselves subordinate on the
global supply chain to countries who were once thought of as “lesser
developed.” This result will not come from increased development from those
countries. Instead, it will derive from the erosion of progress in leading
markets initiated by enhanced competition from countries with lower relative
standards of living. Simply put: without a mechanism to increase those
standards in the poorest countries, the richest countries will find their own
standards retrograded in order to remain competitive. Accordingly, legal
architectures must link free trade and global finance with core worker rights—
or else.
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements hitherto have been the
most effective means of connecting trade and finance with worker rights.4
One of the most recent and revolutionary trade deals that have incorporated
provisions to protect labor rights was the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral Textile
Agreement (“USCBTA”).5
While this emerging field of international law is of monumental
importance for advocating for the continued relevance and expansion of
global economic integration as well as for combating the perils of global
poverty and inequality, it remains an understudied and misunderstood field.6
3

Cf. ARNE MELCHIOR ET. AL., GLOBALIZATION AND INEQUALITY: WORLD
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND LIVING STANDARDS, 1960-1998, 1 (Royal Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000) (arguing that globalization has in fact contributed
to a reduction in global poverty as evidenced by the fact that global inequality as a
whole has decreased since the 1960s), available at
http://odin.dep.no/archive/udvedlegg/01/01/rev__016.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
4
See Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An
Analytical Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13-15 (Fall 2003) (providing the
recent historical background of labor provisions appearing in trade agreements
beginning with the International Trade Organization’s Havana Charter).
5
See Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement, Jan. 20, 1999, U.S.-Cambodia
[hereinafter USCBTA], at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/data/commerce_html/tcc_2/cambodiatextilebilat.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2005); see also Press Release, Office of the United States Trade
Represenative, U.S.-Cambodian Textile Agreement Links Increasing Trade with
Improving Workers’ Rights (Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter PR: Linking Trade and Labor
Rights] (celebrating the USCBTA as a unique agreement linking trade incentives with
labor rights promotion), at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2002/January/U.S.Cambodian_Textile_Agreement_Links_Increasing_Trade_with_Improving_Workers'
_Rights.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
6
See generally Making Globalization Work: Expanding the Benefits of
Globalization to Working Families and the Poor, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
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Fundamental questions arise as to what challenges trade agreements should
attempt to face, how far states should reach in trying to overcome these
challenges, which methods states should use in accomplishing treaty goals, to
what degree two or more states should seek to harmonize domestic social
practices with those of their trading partners, and how much such trade
agreements should depend on international principles?7 In an effort to answer
some of these questions, this article analyzes the goals that the USCBTA
envisioned and the methods the parties used to achieve them.8
Part I explains the background of the treaty.9 This section begins with
an historical discussion of the trend to use trade agreements and programs to
connect economic integration with more intrinsically human issues, such as
labor rights.10 From there, this section transitions to a discussion of the
USCBTA and the labor and political problems that it confronted.11
Then, Part II explains how the treaty addresses each of these
problems and whether the parties are able to achieve the mission that they
established in the trade agreement.12 This part will highlight the successes and
failures of the agreement, arguing that while there is a limit to the extent that
trade agreements can influence domestic labor practices, the USCBTA fell too

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE INT'L LABOR ORG. (Dec. 2, 2002)
(surveying the general problems that globalization has been unable to address and
discussing the possible reasons why globalization has left them unaddressed), at
http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/comm/events/20021202panel1.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005).
7
See discussion infra Part III (answering the questions that the USCBTA failed
to address adequately).
8
See discussion infra Part II (providing the background behind the treaty, the
mission it set out to accomplish, and the role of the International Labor Organization
in helping to ensure substantial compliance in the garment industry with Cambodia’s
Labor Code).
9
See discussion infra Part I (providing the relevant treaty language and
explaining what the treaty sough to accomplish).
10
See discussion infra Part I (placing the treaty’s labor provisions in the context
of Cambodia’s long history of war and political infighting). As the labor movement
has developed, it has remained tethered to the major political parties, which are
themselves remnants of the conflict between warring domestic factions and
international enemies. Id.
11
See discussion infra Part I (explaining the major labor challenges that the
USCBTA sought to address, including freedom of association, the right to organize,
the right to bargain collectively, child labor, working conditions, and employment
discrimination, among others).
12
See discussion infra Part II (examining how the USCBTA confronted the
challenges described in the background section).
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short of that boundary to achieve the lasting, high-impact social change that is
necessary to connect globalization with poverty reduction.13
Part III will elaborate on these commentaries and criticisms.14 This
section will recommend how drafters of future trade agreements can learn
from the USCBTA experience, recommending the kind of labor standards that
future trade agreements should incorporate, how far states should go to
overcome the particular labor issues, and which methods states should use to
deal with them.15
II. BACKGROUND: MAKING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND GLOBAL POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY
A. THE TREND TO PROTECT LABOR RIGHTS IN TRADE
AGREEMENTS BEGAN WITH NAFTA
The USCBTA, an otherwise innocuous textile trade agreement,
punctuated a decade’s evolution towards incorporating labor rights into the
international trade and finance regime.16 This evolution began with the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), the multilateral trade
agreement linking the United States, Canada, and Mexico.17 Accompanying
NAFTA was a side agreement whose drafters designed it theoretically to
13

See discussion infra Part II (providing opposing sets of commentary and
criticism from authoritative observers in an attempt to provide a complete discourse
on what the treaty was intended to do and what the actual effects were).
14
See discussion infra Part III (including issues that the commentary missed).
This legal field is relatively small. Id. The discourse is incomplete, which might
explain why the USCBTA and other treaties have had difficulty in effectuating their
intended results. Id.
15
See discussion infra Part III (arguing that factors like race, class, gender, age,
and culture complicate the field of trade, finance, and labor in a way that treaty
negotiators largely ignore). Ignoring these complexities begs for failure. Id. See also
Amy Kazmin, Cambodia Makes a Final Break With the Past: Three Decades After
the “Killing Fields,” the Country is to Join the WTO in an Experiment That Could
Backfire, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003 (showing that approximately thirty years ago the
Khmer Rouge murdered anyone with an education); discussion infra Part III (arguing
that the USCBTA’s mistreatment of the history of ethnic strife is an impediment
towards a successful protection of labor rights). The USCBTA also ignores that the
textile industry mostly employs Cambodian women, while the managers and owners
are foreign men. Id. The treaty misses the race and gender issues as well. Id.
16
See Polaski, supra note 4, at 14, 15 (surveying the development of the trend to
protect labor rights through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties).
17
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA], available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=42 (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
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protect core worker rights.18 Unfortunately, the labor side agreement’s
provisions were so weak as to render it almost meaningless.19
Despite NAFTA’s failings, the agreement served as a working model
for continued improvement.20 Labor provisions appeared in
• the Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation,21
• the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement,22
• the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement,23
• the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral Textile Agreement, and
• the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.24
Similar provisions also appeared in unilateral trade preference programs
including
• the Generalized System of Preferences,25
• the Caribbean Basin Initiative,26
• the African Growth and Opportunity Act,27 and
18

See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature
Sept. 8, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994)
[hereinafter NAALC] (protecting, in theory, labor rights through dispute resolution
panels), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (last visited Mar.
5, 2005).
19
See Mark J. Russo, NAALC: A Tex-Mex Requiem for Labor Protection, 34 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 51, 119 (2002) (arguing that the labor side agreement
cannot provide effective regulatory development and enforcement of the domestic
labor laws of each of the NAFTA parties).
20
See J.F. HORNBECK, CRS ISSUE BRIEF: THE U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, (Mar. 5, 2001) (The Clinton Administration emphasized the need for
future trade agreements to make up for what NAFTA lacked), at
http://fpc.state.gov/6123.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
21
Agreement on Labour Cooperation, Feb. 6, 1997, Can.-Chile, 36 I.L.M. 1213
[hereinafter Canada-Chile FTA], available at
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/spila/ialc/06Canada_Chile_Agreement.shtml (last
visited Feb. 12, 2005).
22
Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.Jordan, 41 I.L.M. 63, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_
5112.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
23
Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA],
at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset
_upload_file535_3989.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
24
Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing. [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore
FTA], at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/
asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf (last visisted Feb. 12, 2005).
25
Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2467 (2004).
26
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2004).
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• the Andean Preferences Act.28
B. HOW THE USCBTA WORKS
The drafters of the USCBTA were able to draw upon these earlier
agreements and programs to respond to the significant challenges facing the
labor movement in Cambodia’s textile industry.29 The relevant provision of
the USCBTA states,
The Parties seek to create new employment
opportunities and improve living standards
and working conditions through an enhanced
trading relationship; affirm respect for each
Party’s legal system and seeking to ensure
that labor laws and regulations provide for
high quality and productive workplaces; and
seek to foster transparency in the
administration of labor law, promote
compliance with, and effective enforcement
of, existing labor law, and promote the
general labor rights embodied in the
Cambodian labor code.30
To give force to the treaty’s language, inspectors from the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) periodically evaluated the working
conditions inside textile manufacturing firms and published their reports for
interested parties to see, especially American textile buyers and officials of
the American government.31 If U.S. officials considered that Cambodian firms
27

African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3741 (2004),
available at http://www.agoa.gov/agoa_legislation/agoatext.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2005).
28
Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991, 19 U.S.C. § 3201 et. seq. (2004)
(expired Dec. 4, 2001, renewed through Dec. 31, 2006) amended by Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002 in the Trade Act of 2002 §§ 3101-3108
(Pub. Law No. 107-210) (2002)).
29
See generally Wayne Arnold, Translating Union Into Khmer, N.Y. TIMES, sec.
C (July 12, 2001) (explaining the obstacles that unions have faced in the Cambodian
textile industry).
30
USCBTA supra note 5, para. 10(A); see also Labor Code (1997) (Cambodia)
[hereinafter Labor Code] (relying very heavily on the Ministry of Labor to provide
inspectors to enforce the labor provisions), at
http://www.moc.gov.kh/laws_regulation/rkm_labor_law_97.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
2005). The Labor Code was similar to the USCBTA in that both approaches relied on
inspectors to enforce the provisions. Id. art. 25.
31
See Sandra Polaski, Cambodia Blazes a New Path to Economic Growth and
Job Creation, 7-8 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Trade, Equity, and
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had substantially complied with Cambodian labor laws and internationally
recognized core labor rights, the U.S. government would increase export
quotas, allowing Cambodian firms increased access to U.S. markets.32 Unlike
previous trade agreements, the USCBTA used neutral observers from an
international organization to ensure that participating factories were in
compliance with the Cambodian Labor Code as well as an incentive system to
reward factories for complying with the law.33
C. THE LABOR SCENE BEFORE THE USCBTA
As is the situation in many other countries, the greatest challenges to
protecting labor rights in Cambodia appear in the form of state suppression of
collective labor activity—government conduct with a long history beginning
with the Khmer Rouge’s killing fields.34 Despite Cambodia’s history of
Development Project, 2004) (explaining the critical role of the ILO in the
determination of increasing Cambodia’s export quota).
32
See Polaski, supra note 31, at 16-17 (advancing similar structures for future
trade agreements as a mechanism for incentivizing compliance with labor laws).
33
See Polaski, supra note 31, at 16-17 (showing that the USCBTA's approach to
labor enforcement was unique because of the use of the ILO's inspection regime and
the use of the quota system as a reward for industry compliance with the Labor Code).
34
See David Chandler, Killing Fields, [hereinafter Killing Fields] (explaining that
the world may never know exactly how many people died in Pol Pot’s killing fields),
available at http://www.cybercambodia.com/dachs/killings/killings.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2005). The mystery surrounding Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge has made it
impossible to know exactly how many people died during the revolution. Id. See also
Kazmin, supra note 15, at 1 (contrasting Cambodia’s dark history with its rapid
development and lucrative economic opportunities and discussing the cultural
struggle that existed before, during, and after Pol Pot’s brutal regime, which provides
the background for Cambodia’s unique economic successes in the face of dire
national despair). The Khmer Rouge ruled until the Vietnamese took control of
Phnom Penh in 1979, although the Khmer Rouge remained powerful until the early
90s when the group split into two forces, and ultimately lost all power after Pol Pot’s
death in 1998. Id. Pol Pot’s reign of terror began with his deceptive utopian plan to
modernize the country and create perfect equality. Killing Fields, supra note 34. In
1975, the Khmer Rouge captured Cambodia’s capital, bringing to the country’s warravaged people a renewed hope for peace and prosperity. Id. See also Bruce Sharp,
The Banyan Tree: Untangling Cambodian History, 2, (demonstrating the dichotomy
between Cambodians' support of Pol Pot before his reign and the devastation that
occurred after he usurped government authority), available at
http://www.mekong.net/Cambodia/banyan2.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). An
estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died, which was nearly thirty percent of the
population. Id. See also Veron M.Y. Hung, Cambodia, in ASIA-PACIFIC
CONSTITUTIONAL YEARBOOK 1996, at 69-70 (Cheryl Sanders & Graham Hassall eds.,
1998) (explaining that the Paris peace treaty called for the United Nations to assume
administrative control over the government in 1992). The country’s first democratic
free elections occurred the following year. Id. See also Elizabeth Becker, WHEN THE
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conflict, the National Assembly passed the 1997 Labor Code, which offers
thorough protections for labor rights.35 Although the Labor Code provides for
these safeguards, there have been several roadblocks to effective enforcement,
resulting in few protections for workers, especially in the garment industry.36
The section that follows explains these challenges in greater detail.37
D. PROBLEMS THAT THE USCBTA’S DRAFTERS INTENDED THE
AGREEMENT TO CONFRONT
1. Freedom of Association
Cambodia’s labor force consists of approximately 5.4 million people,
the majority of whom work in subsistence farming.38 Eight percent of the
employees work in the industrial sector, with around 200,000 of these workers

WAR WAS OVER: CAMBODIA AND THE KHMER ROUGE REVOLUTION, 441-42 (1998)
(stating that Hun Sen’s party, the Cambodian People’s Party (“CPP”), earned the
second largest bloc in the National Assembly); see generally David P. Chandler, THE
TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY: POLITICS, WAR, AND REVOLUTION SINCE 1945
(1991) (surveying the history of conflict that ensued well into the 90s). Not until
1987 in Paris did peace talks begin between warring factions, including principally
the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese-supported indigent government, the leader of
which was the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen. Id. In 1989 Vietnamese officials
announced that they would remove their forces from Cambodia, which preceded the
signing of the 1991 peace treaty. Id. In 1998, Hun Sen’s political party, the CPP,
gained additional seats in the National Assembly, and an agreement between rival
political factions and the CPP made Hun Sen the country’s sole Prime Minister. Id. In
return, Prince Ranariddh, leader of the CPP’s political rival the Front Uni National
pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacafique, et Copartif (“FUNCINPEC”),
became President of the National Assembly. Id.
35
See Siphana Sok & Denora Sarin, THE CAMBODIA LEGAL RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CAMBODIA 139 (1988) (the 1997 Labor
Code “has clearly provided the necessary legislative reform more conducive to a free
market economy”).
36
See John A. Hall, Human Rights and the Garment Industry in Contemporary
Cambodia, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119, 146 (explaining the weaknesses in the Labor
Code’s enforcement). The Code is only as strong as the will of labor inspectors to
enforce it. Id. The Ministry of Labor is rife with corruption, where low-paid
inspectors receive bribes in the form of money and food to augment their government
income in exchange for turning a blind eye to Code violations. Id.
37
See discussion infra Part II.D.1-3 (discussing the labor problems that the ILO
had to deal with).
38
See INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS BUREAU, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: CAMBODIA
(2003) [hereinafter Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau] (summarizing the state of Cambodia’s
economy), at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/flt/cambodia-2003.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2005).
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employed in the textile industry.39 The relatively small number of Cambodia’s
laborers in the textile trade work in an industry that accounts for roughly
eighty percent of the country’s exports.40 In the late 90s there were nine
registered federations/national labor unions that claimed to represent only
around 160,000 of the 5.4 million workers.41 Eight of those
federation/national labor unions operated in the textile trade.42
The principle challenge to freedom of association was truly free and
independent labor union activity.43 Most of the unions were tethered either to
political parties,44 which used the unions as a political device, or to managers
39

See Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working to Improve
Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Factories, 7 YALE HUM. RTS & DEV. L.J. 79, 82
(2004) (describing the Cambodian garment industry’s demographics).
40
See Amy Kazmin, Nike Weighs Return to Cambodia: ILO Move to Monitor
Factories May Prompt a Change of Heart by the US Sportswear Giant, FIN. TIMES,
June, 18, 2002 (describing Nike’s return to the sizable Cambodian garment industry).
41
See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 3 (reporting that these
numbers include “cumulative, overlapping, out-of-date or entirely fictional
information”).
42
See id. (noting that despite the existence of these large labor federations and
the protections offered to workers in the Cambodian constitution and the Labor Code,
the Cambodian government seldom enforces these rights).
43
See, 3rd man charged in killing of Cambodian labor leader, ASIAN POLITICAL
NEWS, Feb. 9, 2004 (discussing the conspiracy behind the death of Chea Vichea, a
powerful labor leader who died as a result of an assassination). Government
opposition leaders argue that the dominant political parties arranged for Vichea’s
death because of his leadership in Cambodia’s most independent labor union, the
FTUWKC. Id.
44
See Hall, supra note 36, at 146 (providing the history behind Cambodia’s labor
unions and the struggle for freedom of association rights). Cambodia’s oldest union is
the Independent Trade Union of Cambodian Workers (“ITUCW”), which descends
from the Ministry of Unions that existed from 1979 until 1992. Id. The Ministry of
Unions was the sole labor organization in Cambodia at a time when all enterprises
were state-owned. Id. The ITUCW claimed to represent 18,591 members throughout
nineteen of the registered garment unions as of 1998. Id. Its leader is Men Samon,
who is a Member of Parliament under Hun Sen’s CPP. Id. Through Men Samon, the
CPP uses the ITUCW for political purposes and not necessarily for the good of the
ITUCW’s members. Id. The largest of Cambodia’s labor unions is the Cambodian
Unions Federation (“CUF”), which claims to represent 55,700 members of whom
ninety percent works in the textile industry. Id. at 145. Chuon Mom Thol, who leads
the CUF, also serves as the vice-chairman of Cambodia’s Labor Advisory Committee,
which is a forum for employers, workers, and the government to address labor-related
issues, and frequently represents Cambodia’s labor movement at international
functions, including the ILO. Kolben, supra note 39, at 87. However, Chuon Mom
Thol suffers criticism for leading nothing more than a “paper union,” designed to
present a friendly face to the international community, but which in practice does very
little for the employees it represents. Id. Philip Robertson of the AFL-CIO’s Bangkok

2005]

JIMMY HOWELL

427

in the garment industry, who created “paper unions” to appear compliant with
the Labor Code and to suppress otherwise legitimate union activity.45 At the
end of the last decade, the Labor Code’s promises for meaningful rights to
associate freely remained unfulfilled, as the government and private actors
denied workers the ability to organize and to fight for their rights on their
own.46
2. Collective Bargaining
The Labor Code offers little protection in the collective bargaining
field. Originally, the law allowed factory workers to elect shop stewards to
represent the workers to negotiate with management.48 The legitimacy of
47

office in explained in an interview with Hall that paper unions usually consist of
representatives who the factory management has elected, not the workers. Hall, supra
note 36, at 145. The factory management creates election ballots of “approved”
candidates who function for management’s purposes after their election. Id. The Free
Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (“FTUWKC”) is potentially
the most independent of Cambodia’s unions. Id. With unions in sixteen garment
factories representing 117 male and 2,213 female workers, the FTUWKC is
Cambodia’s largest union. Id. Sam Rainsy, of the Sam Rainsy Party, founded the
FTUWKC. Id. As with the other unions, the FTUWKC has received criticism that it
functions for its leader as a source of political power. Id. Of course, the Sam Rainsy
Party is not a part of the CPP-FINCINPEC coalition government and is far from
approaching the power of either party. Hall, supra note 36, at 145. Some
commentators have noted that the FTUWKC may be the start of an independent and
credible labor movement in Cambodia. Id.
45
See Hall, supra note 36, at 149 (providing the history of the Free Union
Federation of Cambodia (“FUFC”), which is a coalition of around one hundred
unions in garment, cement, lumber, and brick factories). Ted Ngoy, who founded the
union in 1993, is a Khmer-American who owns several factories that employs the
FUFC’s members. Id. At the same time that Ngoy founded his union, he also founded
the Development Republican Party. Id. The AFL-CIO has condemned the FUFC as an
illegitimate union that serves as a vehicle for Ngoy’s political and financial ambitions.
Id.
46
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 2000 (Feb. 23, 2001) (explaining that trade unions became more numerous active
because the Government eased the process of union registration and improved labor
law enforcement), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/681.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Despite this growth in union activity, enforcement of the
Labor Code remained a problem. Id.
47
See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (explaining that although
the Labor Code provides for protections of these internationally recognized core
worker rights, the inspectors rarely enforce them because of a lack of proper funding).
See also Kolben, supra note 39, at 85 (documenting evidence of government
corruption as an obstacle to effective labor law enforcement).
48
See Hall, supra note 36, at 139-40 (explaining the election of shop stewards
and the fraudulent circumstances surrounding the elections).
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these elections was questionable as manufacturers strictly controlled the
process for nominating candidates.49 Whatever the validity of the elections,
factory management negotiated with the stewards instead of the unions
because the law provided these stewards with negotiation rights superior to
those of labor unions.50 However, a recent regulation changed the way that
system functioned.51 The regulations established a voting process for
determining who has the right to represent the factory workers, which solved
the steward problem.52 Despite the new regulations, collective bargaining has
been relatively nonexistent.53
3. Employment Discrimination
The predominance of women and girls in the workforce has
facilitated the possibility for employment discrimination along gender lines.54
Although women constitute fifty-two percent of the overall population and
seventy percent of the industrial workforce, the overwhelming majority of
managers in the garment industry are men.55 In fact, in Phnom Penh,
approximately 200 textile factories are in operation, employing around
200,000 workers.56 Over eighty-five percent of these employees are women.57
49

See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (describing the process by
which management influenced steward elections).
50
See id. (demonstrating the way the Labor Code allowed factory management to
circumvent the role of labor unions by using stewards).
51
See id. (discussing the new regulation providing for a process to determine who
has the right to negotiate with management).
52
See id. (observing that despite the new regulation, collective bargaining rights
remain elusive).
53
See Kolben, supra note 39, at 84 (elaborating on the difficulties surrounding
enforcement of the Labor Code due to government corruption).
54
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 2002, sec. 4 (Mar. 31, 2003) (describing the conditions in Cambodian industry
that give rise to gender imbalances in the work place), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18238.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
55
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 2003 (Feb. 25, 2004) (explaining that women comprise 52 percent of the
population, 60 percent of agricultural workers, 85 percent of the business work force,
70 percent of the industrial work force, and 60 percent of all service sector workers),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27766.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2005). Women often are concentrated in low-paying jobs in these sectors and largely
were excluded from management positions. Id.
56
See Kolben, supra note 44, at 82 (describing the employment situation
Cambodia's garment industry).
57
See id. (using factory demographic figures to suggest that the labor rights
agenda is more complex than the employer-employee relationship; gender, race, and
age also play critical roles in deciphering the poor conditions in Cambodia’s textile
industry).
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Although Cambodian law provides women with significant legal protection,
the reality is that many of those protections exist only on paper.58 The 1998
U.N. Report of the Secretary General on the Situation of Human Rights in
Cambodia concluded that “the situation of women in Cambodia, in particular
in relation to their . . . conditions of work and violence against them,
continues to be of deep concern and needs to be addressed as a matter of high
priority.”59 The same report noted that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs
received less than one percent of the national budget in 1998.60 According to
the Cambodian Labor Organization, managers and security guards are
responsible for many abuses of worker rights, such as verbal and physical
abuse, intimidation, and coerced overtime—all of which result from the
managers’ perception of the proper way to treat female employees.61
III. ANALYSIS: ENFORCING THE LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE
USCBTA
Although the USCBTA incorporated the Cambodian Labor Code to
achieve its goals “to improve . . . working conditions,”62 the ILO’s
interpretation of the agreement failed to implement the parties’ objectives.63
While the ILO’s program included some initially promising features, critical
failures occurred in the inspection regime’s:
• organizational structure,
• factory recruitment process,
58

See Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in
Cambodia, Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary General,
U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., ¶¶ 108-17, U.N. Doc. A/53/400 (1998) [hereinafter SG
Report: Cambodia] (describing the laws designed to protect Cambodian women in
contrast to the significant problems women face with regard to employment, health
care, education, and equitable treatment from law enforcement), available at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/genassembly/a-53-400.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005). Cambodian law grants women significant protection from
employment discrimination. Id. ¶ 108; see also Hall, supra note 36, at 158 (asserting
that the Constitution provides for equal rights for women, including equal pay for
equal work).
59
SG Report: Cambodia, supra note 58, at 108.
60
See id. at 110 (suggesting that discrimination against women continues to
persist because of a lack of political will to change it).
61
See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 46, at sec. 6(a) (explaining that the
Cambodian constitution contains explicit language providing for equal rights for
women, equal pay for equal work, and equal status in marriage, but cultural traditions
continue to limit the ability of women to reach senior positions in business and other
areas).
62
USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A).
63
See discussion infra Part III (showing that while the agreement called for the
promotion of the Labor Code, the ILO program never achieved that goal because of
the ILO's weak enforcement role).

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

430

[Vol. 33:3

•
•
•

monitoring and reporting methods,
the incentive structure, and
the interpretation of the Labor Code’s provisions regarding freedom
of association, labor disputes, employment discrimination, and child
labor.64
As a result, working conditions in the garment industry remained
unimproved, in stark contrast to the intentions of the USCBTA’s drafters.65
A. THE ILO ESTABLISHED A PROGRAM THAT WAS TOO WEAK TO
IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN
THE GARMENT INDUSTRY
1. The Project Structure That the ILO Implemented to Enforce the USCBTA
Successfully Encouraged Broad Participation
To implement the Labor Code as the USCBTA required, the ILO
effectively established an organizational structure equitable to all parties
involved, without which the monitoring project never would have developed
and the treaty’s goals never could have materialized.66 Although the
agreement’s language was indeterminate with regard to the organizational
structure and silent on the identity of the parties that the ILO needed to
involve, the circumstances of the business environment in the garment
industry required the ILO to bring together parties from the Ministry of Social
Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training, and Youth Rehabilitation
(“MOSALVY”), the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia, and
the Cambodian trade union movement to discuss the manner in which the ILO
64

See discussion infra Part III (focusing on these critical failures because these
are internationally recognized core labor standards).
65
But see PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 5 (proclaiming the
success of the USCBTA).
66
See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (agreeing that the benefits of trade
should include improved working conditions and living standards for workers in the
Cambodian garment industry, while remaining silent on how the ILO should
implement the Labor Code to achieve those goals). This silence allowed the ILO to
adopt its own organizational structure, removing from the U.S and Cambodian
governments the onus of determining this element in the agreement itself. Id.
Compare Capitalism in the Raw: Labour Rights and Free Trade with the United
States, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2004 [hereinafter Capitalism in the Raw] (suggesting that
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) may never pass through the
U.S. Congress if the agreement fails to include essential enforcement provisions,
which are generally highly contentious when states negotiate trade agreements
because enforcement encroaches on sovereignty), available at 2004 WLNR 15258863
(last visited Feb. 12, 2005), with Russo, supra note 19, at 112-19 (questioning
whether NAFTA’s labor side agreement managed to provide an effective dispute
resolution structure despite bargaining and compromise).
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would structure its implementation program.67 Including these parties in
developing the program was crucial because it allowed all parties with a stake
in the USCBTA to voice their concerns about the way the ILO enforced the
agreement.68 With such involvement, more parties were likely to participate in
the program, allowing an increased number of workers to reap the benefits of
the ILO inspections, which in turn was supposed to lead to improved working
conditions and living standards.69 However, despite the ILO’s novel
organizational structure, those benefits never materialized because of critical
failures in other areas.70
2. The Registration Process That the ILO Adopted Failed to Foster Adequate
Transparency
The USCBTA failed to define how the trade regime would “foster
transparency in the administration of labor law,”71 which allowed the ILO to

67

See Cambodian Govt Expands Partnership With Private Sector, XINHUA
GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 5, 2000 (illustrating the confluence of interests of the
government, the garment industry, and labor interests that the ILO needed to address
because of the great economic value that the industry represented for Cambodia and
its people).
68
See, e.g., INT’L LABOUR ORG., THIRD SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR: STATEMENT OF THE
PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RELEASE OF THE THIRD ILO SYNTHESIS
REPORT ON THE WORKING CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S TEXTILE AND
APPAREL SECTOR (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter Third Synthesis Report] (stating the
opinions of representatives from the government of Cambodia, the Garment
Manufacturers Association in Cambodia, and the Cambodian trade union movement
regarding the ILO’s third synthesis report on the working conditions situation in the
garments industry), at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia3.htm (last visted
Feb. 4, 2005).
69
See INT’L LABOUR ORG., SEVENTH SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR: STATEMENT OF THE
PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RELEASE OF THE SEVENTH ILO SYNTHESIS
REPORT ON THE WORKING CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S TEXTILE AND
APPAREL SECTOR (Sept. 19, 2003) (expressing appreciation that the ILO ensured that
all parties involved had fulfilled their duties, which in turn led to improved respect for
worker rights), at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia7.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2005).
70
But see ILO report reveals improved Cambodian work conditions, WOMEN’S
WEAR DAILY, April 20, 2004 (presenting reports that ILO inspections led to improved
working conditions in textile and apparel factories), available at 2004 WLNR
12873960 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
71
See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (discussing in general terms that
the U.S. and Cambodian governments should promote and rely on transparency, while
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adopt the least stringent registration program.72 The registration process was
essential to transparency because without it any factory could have traded
with the United States, even a factory that refused to allow the ILO to
undertake inspections.73 With this system, at least U.S. businesses knew that
their trading partners in the Cambodian garment industries, at a bare
minimum, participated in ILO labor inspections.74 More than that, however,
the registration process that the ILO adopted involved a contract, the MOU
that the ILO signed with the factories,75 that used a full access clause, which
was essential to achieving transparency.76 Because the MOU required that
factory management give to the ILO monitors full access to the factory,
not including language defining what constitutes sufficient transparency or how the
parties intended to achieve that goal).
72
But see Amy Kazmin, Garment Factories Are Being Forced to Mend Their
Ways, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at 3 (praising the model of transparency as
“unrivalled”), available at 2002 WLNR 6785214 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). The
article also mentioned that factory owners “frantically” telephoned ILO inspectors to
ensure a clean report before the inspectors named their factories individually. Id.
73
See INT’L LABOUR ORG., FIRST SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR, sec. 1.3.1 (Nov. 22,
2001) [hereinafter First Synthesis Report] (explaining that the Ministry of Commerce
corrected this problem by promulgating a regulation that permitted only registered
factories to use allocated export quotas to trade with U.S. markets or to buy export
quotas through the official quota bidding process), at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2005).
74
See Amy Kazmin, Garment Buyers Prefer Cambodia, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2004, at 9 (reporting that while buyers know that Cambodia’s labor standards outrank
those of other major Asian textile exporters, such as Vietnam, China, Thailand, and
Bangladesh, Cambodia ranks worst in terms of “red tape” and customs delays),
available at 2004 WLNR 13022063 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
75
See First Synthesis Report, supra 73, sec. 1.3.1 (explaining the details of the
contract between the ILO and the participating parties).
76
Compare Anthony DePalma, Nafta's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals
Settle Disputes, but Go too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, sec. 3
(reporting criticism that NAFTA tribunals, which investors can use to sue
governments for violations of NAFTA Chapter Eleven provisions, are too secretive,
even though they are effective at protecting investor rights), available at 2001 WLNR
3421720 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). Unlike the ILO program, which uses a regulatory
approach, the NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunals use an adversarial model, which
provides transparency to the fact-finder through pleadings, arguments, and evidence.
Id., with PUBLIC CITIZEN, ANOTHER AMERICAS IS POSSIBLE: THE IMPACT OF NAFTA
ON THE U.S. LATINO COMMUNITY AND LESSONS FOR FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS,
14 (asserting that similar NAFTA provisions are too weak to protect labor rights),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/LatinosReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 4,
2005). Even though workers can bring complaints like those that the investors can
bring under Chapter Eleven, the transparency is ineffective because the labor
provisions are too dilute. Id.
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including free interaction with shop stewards, union representatives, and
factory workers, the inspectors were able to go beyond their checklist by
using interviews to determine the full extent of their working conditions.77
Yet, despite this full access guarantee, the inspection regimen did not require
interviews with workers, it only granted permission for interviews.78 Although
workers were free to interview with the ILO inspectors, the ILO was
powerless to protect workers from intimidation or job loss for reporting
truthfully or for “whistle-blowing.”79 Furthermore, even though the MOU
guaranteed full access in the name of transparency, recipients of the ILO’s
reports knew little more about the factories than their names and what kinds
of suggestions that the inspectors rendered.80
3. The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms Were too Weak to Fulfill the
USCBTA’s Mission
Although the parties to the USCBTA sought to “improve . . . working
conditions” and foster “transparency in the administration of labor law,”81 the
77

See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.1 (explaining further that
while the ILO was interested in obtaining full access to factory employees, the
factories were concerned with inaccuracies that this system could have generated). In
exchange, the ILO agreed that monitoring visits would occur in a fair and objective
manner, that inspections would take place in such a manner as to cause the least
disruptions, that basic information would be kept confidential, and that the ILO would
have considered any allegation of inspection-related misconduct in good faith. Id.
78
See Kolben, supra note 39, at 91 n. 72 (explaining that the United States
rejected earlier proposals for the program that would have granted the ILO greater
power because of concerns for Cambodia’s state sovereignty). Mark Barenberg,
professor of law at Columbia University Law School and an expert on international
labor regulation, designed a stronger proposal that would have granted the ILO a
greater enforcement role. Id. The American Union of Needle Trades and Industrial
and Textile Employees (“UNITE”) in turn lobbied for the agreement to adopt this
plan. Id.
79
But see Sheridan Prasso, Case Study: Bringing Labor Issues Into the
Cambodian Textile Agreement, INITIATIVE FOR POL’Y DIALOGUE, 2003 (asserting that
the mere presence of the ILO gave to Cambodian workers too much power to defend
their own rights), at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/j_cambodia.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2005).
80
See, e.g., id. (lauding the ILO program’s impressive strengths such as
improvements in correct payment of wages, improvements in mandatory overtime,
and improvements with regard to freedom of association protections). Although
Prasso cites to the ILO’s Sixth Synthesis Report, she provides no guidance as to what
constituted a noteworthy improvement or how those improvements related to the
original working conditions. Id. Nor does Prasso articulate whether those
improvements correlated to improved working conditions. Id. Because these reports
contain little information, no one can. Id.
81
See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (linking improved working conditions
in part to transparency into the enforcement of the Labor Code).
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agreement failed in two respects to include sufficient guidance as to how the
ILO was to achieve these goals.82 First, unlike the process that similar treaties
adopted, the USCBTA lacked a frequency clause with regard to the
numerosity of inspections.83 In particular, this agreement failed to specify how
frequently the ILO inspectors should visit the factories.84 More frequent
inspections would have allowed the ILO to report a more complete picture of
the working conditions inside the participating factories.85 The inspection
schedule that the ILO adopted required only two visits to a participating
factory during a six-month time period.86 Although the first visit included a
full-blown inspection regimen involving the 156 question checklist, the
follow-up visit was limited to those aspects of the checklist that elicited a
suggestion from the ILO inspectors during the first inspection.87 The
infrequent inspections meant that the parties to the USCBTA had no certainty
that the laborers in these factories received the benefits of the Labor Code’s
protections on the other days of the year when the ILO inspectors were
absent.88 Yet, those who relied on the reports from these inspections, such as
U.S. businesses and U.S. trade officials, used the ILO reports to make trade

82

But see PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 5 (heralding the ILO
project as exemplary for using trade to increase respect for workers’ rights).
83
See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 23, Annex 18.5 (providing an entire section
for the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement’s Labor Cooperation Mechanism).
84
Compare Id. para. 5(a)-(g) (elucidating seven distinct, but illustrative, methods
of achieving the goals of the U.S. and Chilean governments ), with USCBTA, supra
note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (lacking similar specificity, particularly with regard to
frequency of inspections).
85
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BAD DREAMS: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE
OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA, 6-8 (July, 2004) (asserting that Human
Rights Watch’s reports of Saudi Arabian working conditions would have been more
complete if the inspectors could have conducted interviews of all the available
workers), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/saudi0704/saudi0704.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains closed to human rights
inspectors. Id. The report acknowledged that without sufficient access to work sites,
the conclusions drawn from the reports were an incomplete picture of the full labor
scene. Id.
86
See Third Synthesis Report, supra note 68, sec. 2 (emphasizing that reported
information for the named factories only represents changes in the situation from the
first visit to the follow-up visit).
87
See id. sec. 1.3.2 (stating that the ILO mainly derived the checklist from
provisions located in the Labor Code).
88
But see U.S. EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH, US-CAMBODIAN ECONOMIC AND
TRADE RELATIONS (proclaiming that the USCBTA was an “unqualified success” in
promoting Cambodian economic growth while promoting Cambodia as a laborfriendly country) at http://usembassy.state.gov/cambodia/wwwf0040.pdf (last visited
Mar. 5, 2005).
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policy and business decisions worth millions of dollars.89 Instead of effective
transparency and improved working conditions, the result of these inspections
was an illusion of compliance, which fell far short of the USCBTA’s goals,
but which was all that the agreement’s lax language required.90
Second, the agreement was silent on the specific elements that the
reports needed to include.91 This allowed the ILO to create a reporting system
that allowed the Labor Code to go unenforced.92 This system lacked any
indicia of whether a factory was a major violator or a minor violator.93
Without such a differentiation, the recipients of the reports were unaware of
the full picture of the labor landscape.94 Furthermore, specific details, such as
the circumstances in the named factories that gave rise to the suggestion or the
severity of the Labor Code violation, would have more effectively created
transparency in the garment industry.95 With the deficient language in the
trade agreement, the ILO was free to create an ineffective reporting system.96
4. The Quota Incentive System is Ineffective Because It Creates a Free-rider
Problem
Although the USCBTA provided that the United States would
increase Cambodia’s export quota by up to fourteen percent “if the United
89

See id. (reporting that in 2003 Cambodian exports to the United States
amounted to over $1.2 billion). Eighty-five percent of that amount came from the
textile trade. Id.
90
See USCBTA, supra note 5 (adopting a hollow goal-oriented approach by
specifying goals to which the parties aspired while ignoring the steps by which the
parties would achieve those goals).
91
Compare id. (agreeing to promote "general labor rights" that were "embodied"
in the Labor Code), with First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 2 (elaborating all
of the elements that the ILO chose to incorporate), and Labor Code, supra note 30,
chs. III-XIV (enumerating with great specificity particular protections that workers
should receive).
92
See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (stating that the United
States was willing to trade with any company in the Cambodian garment industry as
long as the industry as a whole substantially complied with the Labor Code).
93
See, e.g., Third Synthesis Report, supra note 68, sec. 2 (noting simply whether
the named factories complied in full, in part, or not all).
94
But see Prasso, supra note 79 (championing the success of the USCBTA in the
field of labor rights protection).
95
See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI (providing a sliding scale of penalties
depending on the kind of labor provision that a factory owner violated).
96
See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.4 (explaining that the first
report only included sixteen percent of the factories participating in the program and
that the monitoring of the factories was not an objective in itself, but rather part of a
larger process to improve the industry as a whole). The report is silent on what the
other parts of the larger process consist of. Id.
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States Government determine[d] that . . . the Royal Government of Cambodia
ha[d] taken . . . major action resulting in a significant change in working
conditions,”97 the incentive structure failed to achieve the treaty’s goals
because the trade agreement allowed grossly non-compliant firms to trade
with U.S. markets.98 This result occurred because the USCBTA granted to the
garment industry a higher export quota if the industry as a whole
“substantially complie[d]” with Cambodian labor law.99 Even those factories
that failed to follow any of the ILO inspectors’ recommendations were able to
trade with the United States at the higher export rate because the industry as a
whole complied substantially with the inspectors’ suggestions.100 For instance,
every year that the treaty was in force, the United States increased the export
quotas, which offered the entire industry enhanced access to U.S. markets.101
However, the synthesis reports show that several factories refused to institute
most of the inspectors’ recommendations.102 Even though these factories
declined to change their business practices, they enjoyed the increased trade
benefits with the United States because the other factories followed the
inspectors’ suggestions.103 For those workers in the “free-riding” factories,

97

See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(D) (conditioning these statements based
on consultations between the U.S. and Cambodian governments).
98
But see Polaski, supra note 31, at 14 (remarking that an impressive number of
factories made rapid changes and corrections to practices that routinely confronted
apparel workers in many countries). The author bases her claims on the flawed ILO
reports. Id.
99
See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (stating the conditions
for which the United States would increase the quota).
100
See Polaski, supra note 31, at 7 (stating that nonparticipating firms could have
shared in the increased trading without the related costs of more stringent labor
policies).
101
See, e.g., Cambodia: U.S. increases garment quota, ASIAN LABOUR NEWS
Dec. 5, 2003 (reporting the quota increases, which yielded over $1 billion in revenue
for Cambodian industry), available at
http://www.asianlabour.org/archives/000183.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
102
See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures (unpublished document, on file
with author) (showing that despite the presence of the labor inspectors and the
positive incentives from the USCBTA, several factories failed to implement the
inspectors' recommendations). This document, compiled from all nine ILO synthesis
reports, lists all of the suggestions that the inspectors made in the areas of freedom of
association, collective bargaining, employment discrimination, and child labor. Id.
This document lists all of the suggestions that the inspectors made with regard to
these issues, how many factories followed these inspections, and the percentage rate
of compliance. Id. It also lists the total number of factories that received suggestions
from each reporting period and from the aggregate of all nine reports. Id.
103
See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (explaining that
industry-wide substantial compliance was sufficient for individual factories to
participate in the increased quotas).
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working conditions may never improve.104 Factories that severely violated the
Labor Code were free to participate in the quota bidding process along-side
firms that adhered to all pertinent labor regulations.105 While the agreement’s
goals were aspirational, its methods embraced mediocrity.106
B. THE USCBTA’S INCORPORATION OF CAMBODIAN LABOR LAW
AND THE ILO’S SUBSEQUENT ENFORCEMENT OF THAT LAW
FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE TREATY’S OBJECTIVES
1. Freedom of Association
The ILO’s method of incorporating the Labor Code’s freedom of
association provisions was insufficient “to improve . . . working conditions”
consistent with the USCBTA’s mission.107 The agreement failed to empower
the ILO with an adequate means of enforcing the Labor Code’s freedom of
association provisions, which guarantee, in part, that “workers . . . have the
right, without prior authorization, to form professional organizations of their
own choosing.”108 Even though the inspectors conducted over 209
104

See Polaski, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing the free-rider problem in
economics terms, but ignoring the fact that that working conditions will not improve
for a large segment of the work force).
105
See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.1 (reporting that even
though the Ministry of Commerce required that all factories interested in trading with
the United States needed to register with the ILO program, there was no requirement
that any of the factories adopt the ILO's suggestions at all).
106
Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (providing in five brief
paragraphs a list of goals and describing the incentive structure, but listing no
methods for achieving those goals), with U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 23, ch. 18
(devoting eight pages and an entire chapter to labor provisions).
107
See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (connecting the goal of improved
working conditions with the Labor Code's freedom of association articles).
108
See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XI, art. 266 (articulating the extensive
freedom of association provisions in twelve articles, but which call upon the Ministry
of Labor to undertake a significant enforcement role, which the ILO lacked under the
USCBTA); see, e.g., Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102
(demonstrating the insufficiency of the ILO's inspections in this regard). Thirty-three
factories received suggestions that they “ensure that workers have the right to freely
form and join trade unions and freely participate in union activities.” Id. Upon the
follow-up visit, the monitors found that seventy-six percent of the factories had
complied with the recommendation. Id. The monitors suggested to fourteen factories
that “management refrain from taking measures that would prevent workers from
freely forming or joining unions and engaging in union activities.” Id. Of these,
seventy-nine percent had complied. Id. The monitors recommended to ten factories
that “management should ensure that union leaders are dismissed only in accordance
with the requirements of the law.” Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra
note 102. Ninety percent of the factories complied. Id. Twenty-two factories received
suggestions that management ensure that “no worker suffers disadvantages because of
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inspections, which resulted in a relatively high-level of compliance with the
articles on freedom of association, workers in the garment industry still
suffered from low unionization and high incidents of suppressed union-related
activity.109 This may have resulted because nowhere in the trade agreement’s
text is there an authorization, implicit or explicit, for the ILO to intervene in
union-management disputes or for the ILO to protect workers who sought to
organize pursuant to the Labor Code.110
Instead of assuming an enforcement role for the Labor Code’s
freedom of association provisions, the ILO’s only method of incorporating the
Labor Code was the use of the 156-question checklist.111 The questions that
the inspector’s asked and the suggestions that they made were little more than
an affirmation of the industry’s respect for existing labor legislation.112 For
instance, one of the suggestions that the inspectors rendered was as follows,
“management [should] refrain from taking measures that would prevent
workers from freely forming or joining unions and engaging in union
activities.”113 But, while the Labor Code expressly called for the Ministry of
Labor to enforce this provision, the ILO merely reported whether
union membership or participation in union activities.” Id. Seventy-three percent of
the factories complied. Id. The inspectors suggested that thirty-two factories hold new
shop steward elections. Id. Seventy-five percent of the factories complied. Id. Ninetythree factories received suggestions to ensure that “the next shop steward elections are
held in accordance with the relevant rules and procedures.” Cumulative ILO
Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. Only twenty-eight percent of these
factories complied. Id. One-hundred seventy-eight factories received suggestions to
ensure that shop stewards are provided two office hours per week, an office, and
working materials to undertake their duties. Id. Only twenty-one percent of these
factories complied. Id.
109
See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 55, sec. 6(a) (explaining the reports of antiunion harassment by employers, including the dismissal of union leaders, in more
than 20 garment factories and other enterprises during the year).
110
See Labor Code, supra note 30, at ch. XII, art. 301 (granting authority to the
Ministry of Labor's inspectors to intervene in labor disputes). The USCBTA fails to
empower the ILO with similar authority. Id.
111
See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.2 (describing all of the
monitoring procedures that the ILO used, including the checklist).
112
See, e.g., Seventh Synthesis Report, supra note 69, sec. 2 (illustrating that the
contents of the checklist consisted of questions that only reflected the contents of the
Labor Code). The checklist method failed to accompany the enforcement power that
the Labor Code contained. Id.
113
See INT’L LABOUR ORG., EIGHTH SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR, sec. 2.1.3.1 (Feb., 2004)
[hereinafter Eight Synthesis Report] (reporting that the inspectors gave this
suggestion only to eleven factories, of whom seven complied in full), at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia8.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2005).
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management violated this element of the code.114 There is no guidance as to
what would have constituted a “measure” to “prevent” workers from “freely”
forming unions.115 The ILO needed to define these terms so that the readers of
the reports could know how closely the factories adhered to the freedom of
association articles.116 For instances, there are criticisms that Cambodian
unions are linked closely with factory owners or political parties.117 We
simply do not know whether these constitute “freely” formed unions under the
ILO checklist system.118 Nor do we know if these unions were acceptable to
the ILO as long as management had refrained from taking the forbidden
“measures.”119 This is the result of the checklist approach.120 While a stronger
enforcement role might have provided more certainty and therefore more

114

See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI, art. 359 (granting to the Ministry of
Labor's inspectors the power to enforce penalties).
115
See id. ch. XVII, arts. 387-89 (creating labor courts that would have the
authority to determine the precise meanings of these words so as to give guidance as
to how the violators of this provision actually treated its workers).
116
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN’S WORK: DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UKRAINIAN LABOR FORCE, 18-26 (Aug., 2003) (providing
an example of a reporting method that other investigators have used that give enough
details to create a complete image of employment discrimination in the Ukraine),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ukraine0803/ukraine0803full.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005).
117
See UNITED NATIONS, SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA, para. 107
(Sept. 18, 1998) (reporting that management often assumed control over unions and
that the government did little to prevent worker intimidation), available at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/genassembly/a-53-400.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005).
118
But see Eighth Synthesis Report, supra note 113, sec. 4 (indicating that the
ILO's successes in the area of freedom of association compensates for problems that
continue to persist in other fields, despite the lack of guidance as to what constitutes
truly free union formation).
119
But see AFL-CIO & UNITE, CENTRAL AMERICA: LABOR RIGHTS AND CHILD
LABOR REPORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRADE ACT OF 2002, SECTION 2102(C)(8)-(9),
19 (June 5, 2003) (arguing that CAFTA should replicate the Cambodian example
because of the ILO's success, despite the clarity in the checklist's language), available
at http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/upload/CAFTA.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005).
120
Compare Seventh Synthesis Report, supra note 69, sec. 1.3.2 (suggesting that
the regulatory approach works best when the inspectors are in a position to see Labor
Code violations, which is problematic because some of the most egregious violations
could go unhidden, especially if factory management is particularly coercive), with
NAALC, supra note 18, arts. 4, 5 (creating a private action for workers and granting
them access to a full tribunal with due process of law). The NAALC's adversarial
approach allows workers to bring to light through pleadings labor law violations that
a purely regulatory approach otherwise might miss. Id.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

440

[Vol. 33:3

transparency, a timid regime of this variety was all that the agreement
required.121
2. Labor Disputes, Conciliation, and Arbitration
The ILO interpreted its role in this area far too narrowly “to improve .
. . working conditions” in the garment industry.122 The Labor Code provides
for remedies of labor disputes in factories that have formal conciliation
agreements as well as those factories where management and workers have
not yet reached such an accord.123 The presence of these latter provisions was
essential because the ILO’s monitory role in this area did little to encourage
registration of collective bargaining agreements.124 For instance, even though
there were over 200 factories in the program, MOSALVY only had registered
approximately twenty collective bargaining agreements.125 The inspections
failed to encourage workers and management to work together to create such

121

Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (leaving an open-ended
labor law enforcement mechanism, which permitted the ILO to adopt the least
stringent means of enforcement), with NAALC, supra note 18, (devoting over fifty
articles, including specific definitions and an entire dispute settlement procedure, as
well as several annexes to developing a stronger enforcement structure). However,
while the NAALC offered workers direct access to the dispute settlement process, the
enforcement structure failed to provide adequate remedies. Id. art. 22.
122
See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (lacking sufficiently specific
information to guarantee that the ILO would adopt the most effective standards to
achieve the agreement's otherwise lofty goals).
123
See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XII, art. 309(a)-(c) (defining the three
separate ways that the Ministry of Labor may intervene to resolve disputes between
management and labor, including a provision that creates a dispute resolution
structure even without a previously written conciliation agreement).
124
But see Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102
(demonstrating that the ILO inspectors found that high numbers of factories violated
this right and only small percentages of the participating factories actually followed
the ILO's suggestions). One-hundred twenty-seven factories received a suggestion to
ensure that workers understood the terms of their employment contract. Id. Only
thirty percent of the factories complied. Id. Sixty-six factories received a suggestion
to amend employment contracts to comply with the law. Id. Only thirty-three percent
of the factories complied. Id. Twenty-two factories received a suggestion to ensure
that dispute settlement procedures comply with the law. Id. Thirty-six percent of the
factories complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102.
Twenty-eight factories received a suggestion to that management should implement
conciliation agreements. Id. Fifty-four percent of the factories complied. Id. Twenty
factories received a suggestion that management should ensure that conciliation
agreements are posted in the workplace. Id. Eighty-five percent of the factories
complied. Id.
125
Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (noting that the low number of
collective bargaining agreements is indicative of failed government policy).
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an agreement and register it with the Ministry of Labor, which could have
enforced the agreement when either party violated the conditions.126
In the absence of these agreements, the Labor Code provided that
workers still could have received arbitration for labor-related disputes with
management.127 Although the USCBTA used the ILO to circumvent the
internal corruption of the Ministry of Labor by using neutral inspectors, the
ILO lacked the authority to implement the functions of dispute resolution and
mediation as the Labor Code provides.128 Under the USCBTA, the ILO’s role
was purely monitory, but that was not enough.129
3. Child Labor
The monitoring and reporting system that the USCBTA adopted
failed to achieve its stated objectives because it was possible that the relevant
provisions of the labor code went unenforced and the number of child workers
went drastically underreported.130 Although the Labor Code called for the
126

See Labor Code, supra note 30, art. 309(a) (noting that the parties could
resolve their dispute through any procedure that they devised in the mutual
agreement).
127
See id. art. 303 (allowing the Ministry of Labor's inspector to intervene in
labor disputes not only when one of the parties notifies the inspector, but even if the
inspector becomes aware of the dispute through other means).
128
Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E)(calling for the promotion
of compliance with the Labor Code, but failing to specify whether the ILO should
usurp the Ministry of Labor's authority as the Labor Code provides), with Labor
Code, arts. 302-08 (granting significant authority to the Ministry of Labor to intervene
in labor disputes, including the power to bind parties to a collective agreement when
the party representing the workers is a trade union).
129
See, e.g., Labor Code, arts. 302-08 (granting the Ministry of Labor a monitory
role, but also providing authority to resolve conflicts). This illustrates that the
National Assembly envisioned that while the Ministry of Labor would conduct its role
through inspections, it also should have significant enforcement authority over those
areas of the Labor Code that factories or workers abrogated. Id.
130
See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (reporting that
the ILO documented only fourteen instances of child labor throughout the four years
of inspections and the two hundred factories that they visited); see also MINISTRY OF
PLANNING, CAMBODIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000: CHILDREN AND
EMPLOYMENT, 33-35 (2000) (indicating that the ILO reports may be troublingly
erroneous), at
http://hdrc.undp.org.in/APRI/NHDR_Rgn/Cambodia/cmbda_nhdr_2000.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005). Approximately forty-two percent of children aged ten to
thirteen were "economically active" during the time period under review. Id. at 31. Of
the children who held jobs, approximately seven to eleven percent worked in the
manufacturing sector, which the report defined as jobs in the garment and apparel
manufacturing, brick-making, and salt production. Id. On average, these children
worked around forty-four hours per week for around thirty-five weeks per year. Id. at

442

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

[Vol. 33:3

Ministry of Labor, and in some cases the Labor Advisory Committee, to
regulate the working environment for workers between eighteen and fifteen
years old131 the ILO had no such power.132 In fact, the USCBTA did not even
require or suggest that the ILO work together with the Ministry of Labor and
the Labor Advisory Committee in the area of child labor.133 That kind of
cooperation would have been the least possible means to ensure that children
received the Labor Code’s protection.134 The result was that the ILO, which
had limited power to discover child labor in the first place, had no power to
prevent or correct child labor violations once the inspectors found them.135
4. Employment Discrimination
For the women working in the garment factories, there was very little
hope for improved working conditions or professional advancement despite
the presence of the ILO and the financial incentives that the United States
government had installed.136 The regulatory model that the ILO adopted failed
in this regard because there was a low compliance rate for the many instances

32. The report emphasized that because of its methodology, the reported numbers
"may grossly understate the number of child workers in the country." Id. at 29.
131
See Labor Code, supra note 30, art. 177 (mandating that the minimum age for
employment is fifteen years old).
132
Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (lacking any discussion of
child labor), with Labor Code, supra note 30, arts. 177-181 (banning child labor and
regulating the means by which children between fifteen and eighteen may seek
employment), and Canada-Chile FTA, supra note 21, art. 25 (offering at least a
mechanism by which to discover and remedy instance of child labor), and U.S.Singapore FTA, supra note 24, ch. 17, art. 17.7(1)(d) (providing that children shall be
protected through the enforcement of domestic child labor laws).
133
See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI (granting the Ministry of Labor the
authority to institute stiff penalties for Labor Code violations). If the ILO cooperated
with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry could have instituted penalties for the
violations that the ILO discovered. Id.
134
But see USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (indicating that even if the
USCBTA's drafters sought to fight child labor, they believed that the ILO effectively
could have done so using alternate methods).
135
See, e.g., First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.1 (describing the
USCBTA as an agreement that provided solely an incentive structure). The agreement
contained no punitive measures. Id.
136
Cf. Andrew Wells-Dang, Linking Textiles to Labor Standards: Prospects for
Cambodia and Vietnam, 2-3 (June 2002) [hereinafter Linking Textiles to Labor
Standards] (asserting that the growth of the Cambodian garment industry may not be
attributable solely or even mostly to the USCBTA's positive incentives) available at
http://www.fpif.org/pdf/reports/PRtxt-labor.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). If this is
true, then there would have been little if any correlation between the trade agreement's
incentive structure and improved working conditions. Id. That would include
women's rights. Id.
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of employment discrimination that the inspectors found.137 Although the
Labor Code provided that those guilty of violating the anti-discrimination
provisions are liable to pay fines, neither the USCBTA nor any domestic
regulations empowered the ILO to impose those penalties.138
Furthermore, the monitoring program failed to take any steps to
equalize the disparity between the number of low-level female employees and
the number of men in management positions.139 Both the Labor Code and the
137

See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (showing that
the inspectors found that forty-seven factories received a suggestion to ensure that no
worker had to pay a fee in order to get a job, while only forty-seven percent
complied). Fifty-four factories received a suggestion to ensure that the piece rate was
set at such a level to permit a worker of average ability working normal hours to earn
the minimum wage. Id. Twenty-one percent complied. Id. Eighty-seven factories
received a suggestion to ensure that ninety days maternity leave is provided, with half
pay for workers who had worked at least one year. Id. Fifty-one percent complied. Id.
Fifteen factories received a suggestion to ensure that workers were not subject to
negative changes in their contract status when returning from maternity leave. Id.
Eighty percent complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102.
One-hundred ninety-two factories received a suggestion that management should
ensure that time-off for breast feeding is provided and that workers are aware of this
right. Id. Twenty-eight percent complied. Id. Nineteen factories received a suggestion
that management should take steps to address problems related to sexual harassment.
Id. One-hundred percent complied. Id. One-hundred nineteen factories received a
suggestion that management should refrain from engaging in indecent behavior. Id.
Twenty-nine percent complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note
102.
138
See Labor Code, supra note 30, arts. 172-76, 182-87, 363 (listing the
protections that women receive under the Labor Code as well as the penalties that
discriminating employers will suffer for violating those provisions). A typical penalty
consists of a fine of thirty-one to sixty days of the base daily wage. Id. art. 368.
However, only the Ministry of Labor has the power to impose this penalty. Id. at 359.
139
See Hall, supra note 36, at 158 (explaining that labor violations in the garment
industry will have a disparate impact on women because of the overwhelming
numbers of women working for men). According to one interview that Hall
conducted, a European consultant for the garment industry discussed Chinese male
managers' relationships with their Cambodian female employees,
They really don't like Khmer women at all. Joke
[sic] about them being ugly and stupid and lazy.
They keep complaining about how the women
here don't work as hard as women in China or
Malaysia, and how they don't want to do over
time . . . They say if they paid these women more
money they would gamble it away, or just get
drunk . . . I've seen these men hit and shout at
women, calling them fucking whores, and
slapping them on the face. Then they laugh about
it, joking with each other.
Id. at 159.
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USCBTA were silent on this issue even though critics of Cambodia’s garment
industry have argued that resolving this imbalance significantly would
improve living standards and working conditions.140 In this regard, the
USCBTA failed to compensate for inadequacies in the Labor Code’s
provisions.141
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: CONNECTING GLOBALIZATION
WITH POVERTY REDUCTION
A. THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE WORKS
Future trade agreements should offer incentives for compliance, such
as the increased quotas that were critical to the USCBTA.142 Although the
quotas that served as the backbone for this plan disappeared on January 1st,
2005, Cambodian officials claim that they will continue with factory
monitoring operations because of the financial benefits that the trade deals
have brought to the national economy.143 Since the quota system for textiles
has ended for WTO members, future trade deals in quota-free industries
cannot replicate the program exactly, but they certainly can offer the benefits
of enhanced trade that accompanies transparency and stability.144
B. FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS REQUIRE ADEQUATE LABOR
LEGISLATION
Future trade agreements may have to confront weak domestic labor
laws.145 The drafters of the USCBTA generally avoided this problem because
140

See SG Report: Cambodia, supra note 58, ¶ 116 (discussing the alarming
instances of discrimination against women, especially violent incidents).
141
See Linking Textiles to Labor Standards, supra note 136, at 2 (asserting that
the ILO was unable to overcome many other challenges to the Cambodian labor
environment). For instance, internal corruption, a lack of resources, and a weak
judicial system has resulted in gross under-enforcement of the Labor Code, which is
why the ILO needed to compensate in some degree for these inadequacies. Id.
142
See, e.g., USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (creating a prototypical
incentive structure that should be studied, modified, and then replicated).
143
See Polaski, supra note 31, at 9 (explaining that textile quotas disappeared for
Cambodia when it joined the WTO).
144
See id. at 9, 16-17 (describing the many reasons why Cambodia has chosen to
continue adhering to the ILO inspections even though the quota system has ended,
including the commercial benefits that flow from consumer confidence in laborfriendly garments). Polaski argues that future trade agreements can replicate the
USCBTA program through the use of positive incentives. Id. at 17. However, Polaski
leaves unaddressed the merits of a hybrid structure that incorporates both positive and
negative incentives. Id.
145
See, e.g., Codigo de Trabajo (El Sal.) (1972)(amended 1994, 2004) (providing
relatively weak labor protection), available at

2005]

JIMMY HOWELL

445

of Cambodia’s relatively thorough Labor Code.146 Arguably, however, the
Cambodian experience is similar to countries without comprehensive labor
laws because of widespread corruption in Cambodia’s judiciary and labor
ministry, which has resulted in systemic under-enforcement.147 In that regard,
the Cambodian experience may be similar to countries without any kind of
labor legislation at all, because the result is the same in both circumstances:
little or no labor protection.148 To circumvent these and similar problems,
future trade agreements should include their own labor provisions, articulated
with the kind of particularity that will create an effective enforcement body.149
C. NUMEROUS INSPECTIONS ARE CRITICAL TO ADEQUATE
TRANSPARENCY
Inspections must be sufficiently frequent and thorough to offer the
kind of transparency that is needed to ensure that the private sector is in
compliance with labor standards.150 A critical drawback to the USCBTA was
the small number of inspectors that the parties used to achieve the
agreement’s vision and the few inspections that the inspectors undertook.151 In
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/49592/65113/S95SLV01.htm; see
also Capitalism in the Raw, supra note 66 (explaining that, unlike the USCBTA,
CAFTA cannot depend on countries, like El Salvador, to enforce their own labor
codes on the grounds that those labor laws are too lax).
146
See generally Labor Code, supra note 30 (providing relatively thorough labor
protections). The Labor Code relies primarily upon the Ministry of Labor for
enforcement, which is notorious for under-enforcement. Id.
147
See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Judiciary on Trial, (June
20, 2001) (condemning Cambodia's judiciary for corruption and lack of political
independence), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/06/20/cambod149.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005).
148
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES2004: CAMBODIA, sec. 6(a) (Feb. 28, 2005) (asserting that the Labor Code went
unenforced in 2004 due to a lack of political will), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41638.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
149
See, e.g., NAALC, supra note 18, Annex 1 (providing a list of labor principles
that guide the parties' domestic legislative priorities). While this language is merely
aspirational, it remains more prototypical than the USCBTA, which lacks any guiding
labor principles. Id.
150
See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (explaining that two inspections during a
four-year time period is insufficient to conclude, infer, or even speculate that
Cambodian factories abided by anything more than the worst labor standards
imaginable).
151
See INT’L LABOUR ORG., NINTH SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING
CONDITIONS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR, sec. 1.3 (July 2004)
(reporting that the project, which by the ninth report had included at least 243
factories, had recruited only eleven inspectors), at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia9.pdf (last visted
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order to achieve more transparency, there must be more inspectors and more
inspections.152 Two visits within a four-month period are insufficient to
ensure that the visited businesses are in substantial compliance with the
law.153
D. INDUSTRY-WIDE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IS NOT ENOUGH
The Cambodian example suffered from a severe free-rider problem.154
The USCBTA allowed working conditions to lag in some areas as long as the
industry as a whole substantially complied with the law.155 While it may be
unrealistic to require a higher standard of the entire industry, a better solution
would have granted preference to firms that participated in the program at
different levels of compliance.156 For instance, firms that complied the most
should have had special access to the domestic quota bidding process, while
firms that complied the least should have had restricted access to U.S. markets
via the local bids.157 In the absence of quotas, inspectors can rank firms
according to their compliance with the relevant labor standards and
recommend the best firms to U.S. businesses and provide a warning to avoid
the least compliant businesses.158
E. ADJUDICATION IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT TO ENFORCEMENT

Feb. 4, 2005). However, the small number of inspectors may have been sufficient
since the program so infrequently sent them to inspect participating facilities. Id.
152
See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating the need for
more inspections in order to achieve credible results).
153
But see supra notes 70, 72, 79, 82, 88, 98, 119 and accompanying text
(showing that the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia, two
mighty super unions, an international trade scholar, and at least two reputable
journalists proclaimed the ILO program as an exemplary success story on the meager
basis of two inspections conducted in a four-year time span with methods of dubious
reliability).
154
See supra discussion Part III.A.4 (explaining that the incentive structure
allowed grossly noncompliant and defiant facilities to trade with the United States).
155
See supra discussion Part III.A.4 (proving that the free-rider problem was
directly related to industry-wide standard).
156
But see Polaski, supra note 31, at 17 (eschewing any use of negative
incentives, which logically would include the sliding-scale approach advocated here).
157
See Linking Textiles to Labor Standards, supra note 136, at 3 (arguing that the
disconnect between factory compliance and quota allocations served as a challenge to
effective implementation and monitoring).
158
See Regina Abrami, Worker Rights and Global Trade: The U.S.- Cambodia
Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement, Harvard Business School Case Study, No. 9-703034, at 15 (Aug. 2003) (arguing that consumer pressure will be strong enough to
encourage socially responsible business practices).

2005]

JIMMY HOWELL

447

Another means of solving the transparency problems that inhere in
regulatory models, such as the one that the USCBTA adopted, involves
incorporating other kinds of legal architectures into the enforcement
mechanisms.159 Future trade agreements need to pull private companies out of
the shadows of international law and allow workers to compel their employers
to comply with labor codes.160 At the very least, there needs to be a public
forum where employees can present violations of labor laws and where the
owners can present their side of the story, shedding light on violations that
inspectors otherwise might overlook.161 An adjudication system might provide
negative reinforcement that accompanies the positive incentives from
increased access to U.S. markets.162
It is critical that the public has access to the adjudication system and
that the employees can obtain effective redress for labor code violations.163
The lack of redressability was a critical failing of the NAFTA labor side
agreement.164 For instance, a typical remedy for violations involves merely a
ministerial meeting between low-level U.S. and Mexican officials.165 By
contrast to the remedies that NAFTA offered to workers, NAFTA’s chapter
eleven dispute settlement procedures offered more meaningful protections to
investors who could obtain financial compensation for violations of the

159

See, e.g., Laurence Hefler & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (comparing and
contrasting different methods of international dispute resolution systems); see also
John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental
Law: The Submission Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2001) (arguing for a different method for compliance in NAFTArelated environmental disputes).
160
But see Kolben, supra note 39, at 91 n. 72 (implying that approaches such as
this, which encroach on state sovereignty, will face significant political obstacles).
161
See supra note 76 and accompanying text (showing that the ability to bring a
lawsuit in an adversarial setting might increase transparency into the administration of
law law).
162
But see supra note 156 (demonstrating the opposition to hybrid positivenegative incentive structures).
163
See Michael Posner, An Open Letter to Ambassador Robert Zoellick,
(November 26, 2001) (arguing for changes in the USCBTA that would have allowed
non-governmental actors to play at least a minimal role in the administration of the
Labor Code), at http://ur.rutgers.edu/news/ACLA/lchrcambodia.htm (last visited Mar.
5, 2005).
164
See Russo, supra note 19, at 112-18 (describing the faults in the NAFTA
dispute settlement procedures).
165
See NAALC, supra note 18, art. 27 (aspiring to redress labor violations
through ministerial consultations).
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agreement’s provisions.166 Future trade agreements should adopt an
adjudication system similar to NAFTA’s chapter eleven, in conjunction with
the USCBTA regulatory approach.167
CONCLUSION
There is a great need for incorporating labor rights provisions into
bilateral, multilateral, and regional trade agreements. However, it was only
towards the end of the last century that governments experimented with
different types of legal systems to address labor issues. As the debate on this
matter moves forward, more attention must focus on the most effective and
appropriate legal architectures for labor rights protection in the trade context.
The USCBTA was the purest example of a regulatory model that governments
have used to link trade and labor protection. The weaknesses in a purely
regulatory model indicate that a different approach may have more success.
While purely adjudicative models have their own drawbacks, the best
approach may be a hybrid of the two. A regulatory-adjudicative model for
labor rights enforcement may be the best way to improve living standards and
working conditions world-wide. Given the shortcomings of the USCBTA, let
us hope that this is not the best that we can do.

166

See generally NAFTA, supra note 17, ch. Eleven (describing the procedures
by which investors can obtain redress for violations of enumerated investment
protections).
167
See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (revealing the weaknesses in the regulatory
model alone).

